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Introduction
The deployment to the Persian Gulf was the fastest buildup of conventional airpower in history.
-Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey
Most analysts agree that U.S. military action in the Gulf War was a success. As such, it would be incorrect to say that the logistics system in the Gulf War was not a success. In fact, after-action reports reveal logistics considerations did not limit decision-making by commanders at either the tactical or strategic level. 1 The logistics system was effective.
Nevertheless, logistics efficiency was not achieved. 2 Although numerous lessons learned studies were conducted following the Gulf War, little was done to correct the inefficiencies they uncovered. Six years after the end of the Gulf War redeployment, those logistical deficiencies remain in the system. In fact, the same problems were prevalent during The 1996-1997 US troop deployments to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint
Endeavor.
Although problems occurred within each of the logistics disciplines (including but not limited to supply, maintenance, and transportation), this analysis reveals several commonalties. These include lack of communication and connectivity between automated systems, poor source automation, and lack of near real-time access to information. Had the U.S. not been given 6 months to deploy its forces and establish its infrastructure, and had we deployed to a region not equipped to support traditional communication (e.g., land lines), success in the Gulf might not have occurred with such relative ease. The reality is, as military budgets are cut and forces are down-sized, we must begin exploiting available technology as a means of achieving efficiency.
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Examination of currently available technology reveals the solutions to these problems are now within reach "but they involve radical departures from our current ways of doing business." 4 To rectify the logistics problems encountered during the Gulf War, logisticians must solicit joint solutions and cast aside inter-service rivalries. The logistics infrastructure must be modified by standardizing data requirements and providing instantaneous connectivity between logistics disciplines and between services. Source automation must be integrated into the logistics network to provide the initial link in the asset visibility chain.
This paper is divided into four parts. The first provides a brief description of some of the logistics command and control (C 2 ) problems encountered during the Gulf War and the ramifications of those problems. The second analyzes COMBAT TRACK, an Air
Force Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (AFTENCAP) initiative designed to help solve those problems. The third section highlights areas conducive to incorporation of space technology into future logistics efforts. This paper closes with answers to questions remaining about the utility of space-based assets in the logistics arena and also provides concluding remarks. 
Notes

-Martin Van Creveld Supplying War
Although several logistics command and control (C 2 ) difficulties were encountered during the Gulf War, this paper focuses on three that are interrelated and can be corrected through the application of existing technology. Those three are communication and connectivity; source automation; and near real-time access.
Communication and Connectivity
Logisticians must concentrate on developing an automated network of systems to allow near-real time visibility and control of cargo from depot to foxhole. During the Gulf War, numerous systems at both the joint and service level were used to provide oversight of cargo from point of origin to point of destination. Those systems ranged from the Perhaps John Bucher, in his paper entitled "System Synergism for 21st Century
Logistics" states it best: "Today's logistics is a highly segmented, linear architecture.
Each node of the system focuses on increasing its own efficiencies without regard to overall system performance…Not only have individual services fielded redundant systems, there remain unique systems for individual classes of supply within the services themselves." Storm. In effect, load plans created using ALPS were recreated using CALM if the cargo moved through an Air Force aerial port.
Turning to the logistics disciplines within a given service (e.g., supply and transportation in the Army, or transportation and supply in the Air Force), we see similar communication and connectivity problems. The Gulf War Airpower Survey (GWAPS) found that "Air Force customers were forced to manually track items moving through the Air Force pipeline using two separate and distinct sets of status numbers. The supply system tracks items through the requisition process against a unique requisition number."
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The transportation community, on the other hand, uses a unique transportation control number (TCN) to track that same item once it enters the transportation system. Further complicating the matter, supply documentation is not decipherable by transportation systems. As a result, the requisitioner must retain both the supply and transportation tracking numbers to monitor status of an item in the distribution cycle. Additionally, transporters have to manually enter pertinent bits of data from supply documentation into transportation systems. These inefficiencies were a prime source of error and customer dissatisfaction during the Gulf War and a leading cause of the Air Force's inability to provide visibility of an item as it moved from supply to transportation. In fact, when items were lost during the transfer from supply to transportation, they were frequently never found. All too often, customers merely reordered the item needed.
Despite the findings in some after action reports, it is apparent that the lack of communication and connectivity did impact operational efficiency during the Gulf War. 
Source Automation
Source data automation is a necessity on today's fluid battlefield because people make mistakes and cannot always perform data input fast enough to meet operational requirements. As highlighted in the previous section, insufficient or incorrect data provided on the shipping end affects lift allocation-often at an extraordinary cost. It also intentionally duplicated high priority requisitions to ensure the item would eventually be received. 9 This created an additional strain on already heavily tasked lift assets.
During the Gulf War, human error often precipitated incorrect or incomplete source data. "As a result of the President's decision to rapidly redeploy from Southwest Asia, many units did not inventory their material before packing it and did not prepare the documents necessary to identify container contents or efficiently move packed containers back to the United States." 10 Had a source automated system been in place before Desert Shield/Storm began, units could have prepared documentation in time to meet redeployment requirements.
Automating data collection at the source saves time and increases accuracy. Manual data input is both unreliable and inefficient. Each time information is manually entered into an automated system, the chance for error increases. Because of that error, visibility over the item decreases. Because intra-service logistics systems (i.e., supply and transportation) do not use common data elements and inter-service logistics systems (e.g., load planning) cannot talk to each other, operational efficiency is severely degraded.
Lack of source automation also inhibits a commander's ability to rapidly make educated decisions. Logistics systems must be flexible and reliable, providing commanders the information they need to make operational decisions. Commanders must be able to quickly locate items that have entered the logistics pipeline. This provides them the information necessary to divert essential equipment and personnel as the situation dictates.
Each of the services has identified the need for automated source data. Air Mobility Command (then Military Airlift Command) began efforts in the late 1980s to use bar-code technology to help eliminate the need for manually capturing data required for cargo manifests and load plans. Unfortunately, due to a lack of appropriate equipment, nonexistent service-wide procedures, and insufficient personnel training, a reliable bar-code system is still not used consistently throughout the Command.
Following the Gulf War, the Army began concerted efforts to use radio frequency (RF) tags developed by the Savi corporation to capture the data normally included with pallet and container documentation. RF tags were used effectively by the Army during numerous deployments, including Operations Uphold Democracy in 1994 and Joint Endeavor in 1996. However, serious effort to integrate bar-coding and RF technology has not occurred within or between services. As a result, effective and consistent source automation throughout the services is not a reality.
Near real-time Access
In "Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Logistics Lessons Learned," the Naval Planners on MAC's Crisis Action Team were also frustrated by the lack of accurate, near real-time data. So much so that they established a requirements augmentee cell to contact deploying units by telephone, to verify TPFDD requirements before scheduling lift. Planners and airlift schedulers found this data much more accurate and timely than data available through JOPES.
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Customers and planners were not the only ones lacking near real-time visibility.
According to GWAPS, "MAC did not have the capability to determine where aircraft were on a real-time basis." 13 The Global Decision Support System (GDSS) was designed to provide this information but units in the field could not access the database. Thus, GDSS served as an after-the-fact source of data, of little value to decision makers.
14 Commanders frequently did not have the logistics information necessary to respond to changing priorities and battlefield requirements.
With the end of the Cold War, U.S. military forces are being tasked to support a variety of missions world wide with smaller supply reserves. We must be cognizant that the logistical feasibility of a plan can, and does, impact plan development and execution.
Logisticians must, therefore, develop a flexible, responsive logistics architecture.
Traditional methods of connectivity may not be available in areas of future conflict.
Further, these methods are no longer responsive enough to keep pace with the modern battlefield. If logisticians are to be successful, they must develop systems capable of operating in the joint arena; service-unique systems using traditional land-line communications simply do not meet the needs of commanders, planners, or customers.
This architecture must incorporate space-based assets and allow for the rapid integration of future technology. The next chapter reviews COMBAT TRACK, a prototype system employing space-based assets to track military aircraft, cargo, and passengers worldwide. The third layer provides digital terrain data which can be combined with imagery of charts to provide three-dimensional views. It is based upon the Defense Mapping Agency's level one (100 meter) Digital Elevation Terrain Data (DTED). As with the first two layers, this information is loaded into the MSTS data bank prior to installation on the aircraft.
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Layer four provides an overlay of the ground threat picture using world-wide, overthe-horizon intelligence data from RC-135 Rivet Joint (RJ), and National sources. This data is fed live to the aircraft, providing near real-time information about the ground threat.
The theater air picture is provided in layer five. Here, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and RJ data are fed live to the aircraft, providing near real-time information regarding actual air threats.
Secondary imagery is incorporated into layer six. Both national and tactical satellite and aircraft sources are used to provide near real-time images for this layer. Images include, but are not limited to, drop zones and airstrips.
3 These data augment the air and ground pictures provided by other layers and are fed live to the MSTS aboard the aircraft.
COMBAT TRACK data is the seventh and newest level of information. In this level, Global Positioning System (GPS) position reports and logistics data from a variety of potential sources are overlaid onto the other six levels of data. This layer is the subject of this paper and is described in greater detail throughout the remainder of this chapter.
COMBAT TRACK incorporates data relayed from military satellites worldwide.
Data processed and broadcast by software and hardware includes GPS position, two-way message text, load plan, and cargo manifest information. Additionally, "The prototype, proof of concept system is compatible with the Army's Battlefield Distribution System (BDS)." 4 COMBAT TRACK can read and interpret radio frequency tags and/or bar codes placed on cargo (either by item or by pallet). Further, data can be manually input to the system, allowing greater flexibility and in-flight corrections or modifications. A more detailed description of specific COMBAT TRACK capabilities is included in the next section.
Combat Track Advantages
In its current version, COMBAT TRACK addresses three stated AMC deficiencies.
First, it allows near real-time flight following of aircraft (i.e., aircraft tracking). Second, it allows secure, near real-time communication with the aircraft (much like secure electronic mail). Third, it provides visibility of cargo and passengers on board the aircraft. We must note, however, that though COMBAT TRACK was initially developed for use on aircraft, it can be installed on any mode of transportation (trucks, trains, and ships, for example).
Several features make COMBAT TRACK a unique and promising system. Recall from the previous chapter that this paper focuses on three logistics C 2 problems:
communications and connectivity; source automation; and near real-time access. By design, COMBAT TRACK addresses each of these problems with a multitude of solutions. Those solutions are highlighted below.
Communication and Connectivity
COMBAT TRACK uses a time-division-multiple-access (TDMA) data burst scheme to allow multiple users on the same satellite channel. The user defines the burst interval, from every 10 seconds to several hours. Using 10 second burst intervals, a single channel can support 30 users. Changing the burst interval to every 5 minutes, 900 users can be accommodated on one channel.
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The COMBAT TRACK system uses satellite channels owned by the military (Satellite Communications, SATCOM), rather than commercially owned and operated systems.
This keeps the cost down (commercial INMARSAT costs up to $2 per minute, while the use of military SATCOM channels costs the user nothing). 6 Additionally, commerciallyowned satellites are subject to the priorities of the owner. If the system owner doesn't support an operation, he can merely deny use of the system; an unacceptable alternative for military operations.
COMBAT TRACK also provides secure data transmission. This protects both the aircraft and its contents from inadvertent discovery by potential adversaries. Thus, even if the aircraft position is not considered sensitive, data transmitted about the contents of the aircraft is still secure. Conversely, broadcasting cargo and/or passenger data does not put the aircraft at risk by revealing aircraft position, speed, flight path, etc.
Additionally, McDonnell-Aerospace personnel designed the COMBAT TRACK software giving priority to connectivity with other systems. Given the appropriate software interface, the contractors believe they could connect to any system currently used, or planned for use, in the Defense Transportation System.
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Source Automation
COMBAT TRACK provides for source automation by combining bar-code and radio frequency tag technology to identify cargo. It then transmits that information to an existing Air Force transportation system (e.g., the Consolidated Aerial Port System, CAPS) for consolidation into a cargo manifest. Eliminating the need to manually input data into other automated systems reduces the potential for human error. Additionally, it increases flexibility in the entire logistics system because it is not confined to data gathering via just bar-codes or just RF tags.
Near Real-Time Access
COMBAT TRACK affords all users near real-time access to cargo location once that cargo is in the system. COMBAT TRACK components identify cargo as it is loaded onto an aircraft (or truck, train, or ship). For example, as the aircraft departs a station, the aircraft position and cargo data are automatically broadcast. If a CALM loadplan is available on disk, COMBAT TRACK can read and transmit loadplan data to downline stations. If a loadplan disk is not available, the loadmaster can use COMBAT TRACK to manually sketch and transmit the load plan or passenger manifest to downline stations.
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Using the COMBAT TRACK system eliminates the need uncovered during Desert Shield, to meet every aircraft with a forklift and a bus. Personnel at downline stations know exactly where an aircraft is and when it will arrive on station. Further, port personnel know what type of cargo is on board and its corresponding pallet position.
Thus, if cargo requires special handling (mail, refrigeration, etc.) the appropriate personnel can meet the aircraft with the right equipment. This allows materials handling equipment (MHE) and personnel to be in place as the aircraft is parked, potentially reducing ground time and ramp saturation, and maximizing the use of personnel and equipment.
The end user also benefits from COMBAT TRACK. When fully implemented, COMBAT TRACK allows the requisitioning unit complete visibility once the item enters the system. This eliminates duplicate requisitions and allows the user to plan for the item's arrival. Thus, if a unit is awaiting the arrival of a high priority item, they can be at the port when the item arrives.
Miscellaneous Advantageous Features
Another advantage of COMBAT TRACK is its Snap-On design. This means systems do not have to be permanently installed-anywhere. Instead, they are rugged, portable, and self-contained. The Snap-On feature allows COMBAT TRACK units to be quickly removed and reinstalled where needed. 9 This potentially reduces the number of systems needed by a unit to maintain maximum operational efficiency. Hypothetically, if a unit has 12 primary assigned aircraft but only an average of 9 fly at any given time, only 9 systems would be needed.
Another feature of COMBAT TRACK is its evolutionary design. Each time the system is demonstrated, a detailed wish list is compiled by the user and subsequently passed to SWC action officers and the contractor. The list is prioritized and the contractor adds new capabilities to the software (as in the case of the electronic link to CALM) as funding permits. Although the time it takes to modify the software varies according to the task, all software changes to date have been accomplished within one month of funding allocation.
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Combat Track Limitations
Although COMBAT TRACK has great promise, serious shortfalls remain.
Interestingly, those shortfalls are generally a result of conscious decisions rather than design flaws within the COMBAT TRACK system. This section summarizes the shortfalls and provides suggested corrective actions.
Perhaps the greatest limitation of COMBAT TRACK is satellite availability. Though this system takes advantage of TDMA and data-burst technology, finding a channel to dedicate to logistics endeavors is difficult. There are, however, work-arounds to the problem. During Operation Joint Endeavor, a SATCOM voice channel dedicated to medical evacuation was used for COMBAT TRACK data transmissions without limiting medical evacuation capability. 11 A test channel was also used to accomplish several of the demonstrations. Unfortunately, no permanent logistics channel has been assigned. The procedures exist to correct this limitation. As such, the logistics community should lobby for at least one dedicated logistics channel in each satellite footprint. Unfortunately, no system other than COMBAT TRACK can provide the vital near real-time information requested by USTRANSCOM customers. To alleviate this deficiency, COMBAT TRACK should be recognized as a feeder system and used at all major ports and depots (if not at all units). Before this can be done, however, COMBAT TRACK must be recognized as part of the DOD migration plan. This comprehensive plan identifies current automated transportation systems that will either be eliminated or designated as core systems. Though the plan has merit, it does not allow for incorporation of systems using new, or cutting edge, technology. Thus, though we will have fewer systems operating, we in the DOD will still be behind commercial industries (e.g., United
Parcel Service (UPS) and Federal Express (FEDEX) who regularly update their systems to incorporate new technology.
A fourth limitation of COMBAT TRACK is that it does not provide a data base for storage and retrieval of data. To date, only data entered into COMBAT TRACK and actually on a moving platform are tracked. Consequently, anyone wanting information about cargo or passengers awaiting movement, received at an in-transit location, or received at final destination, must rely on other automated data systems or telephone inquiry. Systems currently planned or in use do not, as pointed out earlier, provide the timeliness or level of accuracy required.
As stated earlier, including COMBAT TRACK as part of the GTN network of feeder systems would correct this problem. GTN could then serve as the data base, allowing storage and retrieval of information. COMBAT TRACK provides the missing link caused by GTN's inability to track cargo while it is actually in transit. Further, COMBAT TRACK reduces reliance on manual data input; a problem common among all other GTN feeder systems.
This chapter has provided a brief summary of the capabilities, advantages and limitations of COMBAT TRACK. The next chapter highlights logistics areas conducive to incorporation of space-based assets. Notes 1 Duink, Barbara A., Lt. Col., USAF. "SWC/DOB Trip Report." Paragraph C(1) states "USTRANSCOM and AMC's goals are the capability to identify and track the movement of Defense mobility assets, cargo, passengers, medical patients, and personal property from origin to final destination during peace and war." For more information, suggest interested readers review the "1994 Year of In-Transit Visibility Action Plan," 11 January 1994. 3 Those interested in more specific detail on available images should contact personnel at the SWC, Falcon AFB, Co. or the nearest Joint Intelligence Center.
4 COMBAT TRACK Flyer. 5 Though the number of stated users allowable is mathematically possible, it has not been demonstrated. 6 Blanton, James P. "Talking Paper on AERO-C INMARSAT and COMBAT TRACK." 7 Brown, Alan A., Col., USAF (Retired.) Telephone interviews, September 1996 through February 1997.
8 As a result of use during Operation Joint Endeavor Redeployment, the contractor is developing connectivity with the Computer Automated Load Manifesting (CALM) system This will eliminate the need to manually develop a load plan on board the aircraft. Because cargo is identified as it is loaded on the aircraft, the CALM load plan will automatically be verified and updated, reflecting what cargo is actually on board, its off load point, and the ultimate destination.
9 For example, installation on a C-130 takes approximately 30 minutes. 10 
Potential Logistics Applications Of Space-Based Assets
The previous chapter highlighted the advantages of space-based assets in the logistics arena based on knowledge gained through COMBAT TRACK testing and deployment.
Among the most obvious advantages are the increased communication and connectivity resulting from near real-time access to information and reduction of manual data input via source automation. COMBAT TRACK has opened the door to increased innovation and application of space-based assets in non-traditional roles.
1 The applicability of space in all facets of the military is limited only by imagination. This point was solidified during the course of interviews conducted for this research endeavor. This chapter summarizes several potential uses of, and a prototype system inspired by, the technology demonstrated by COMBAT TRACK. These findings are by no means all inclusive; indeed astute readers will discover that one idea merely spawns another.
Self-Contained Navigation System (Scns) Data
Air Data sent via space-based assets could include (but not necessarily be limited to) fuel use rates, oil pressure, engine temperature, and throttle positions. Data would also serve as an historical data base and could potentially warn of an impending problem, such as propeller failure. The safety implications in this situation are obvious. As with SCNS data, both the supply and maintenance functionality could benefit from this information.
Aircraft Maintenance Debrief
Immediately following landing, the aircrew provide a thorough debrief of the aircraft's performance and maintenance data to aircraft maintenance personnel. In many cases, this briefing is the maintenance team's first notification of a maintenance problem.
Following the debrief, maintenance crews of various Air Force specialties equipped with a myriad of equipment, are dispatched to the aircraft to download data (e.g., from the SCNS) and perform a variety of diagnostic tests. Once the problem is identified, maintenance crews repair the aircraft and order replacement parts as required.
This process could be expedited using space-based assets to transmit both aircraft performance data and an automated debrief accomplished by the aircrew (especially, but not exclusively, if a crew chief is part of the aircrew). 4 Maintenance personnel could order replacements, request in-flight tests, and have the right maintenance specialties available to meet the aircraft upon landing. This would reduce debrief time, minimize aircraft down time, and save many hours of on-ground tests, thereby maximizing one of our most critical resources-manpower.
Fuel Tracking: The In-Flight Receiver Identification System
During a COMBAT TRACK in-process review at AMC, one of the attendees mentioned that AMC was unable to accurately bill all customers who received fuel during 
Conclusion
This paper has focused on the logistics C 2 problems encountered during the Gulf War and the recent use of space-based assets to alleviate those problems. Despite the apparent success of COMBAT TRACK, the system has still not been integrated into the DOD's network of transportation systems. As a result, questions concerning the utility of spacebased assets in the logistics arena remain. Throughout the course of this paper, several of those questions have been answered; however, a brief synopsis is provided in this section to ensure clarity. This chapter closes with a summary of findings concerning the current and potential utility of space-based assets in the logistics arena.
Revisiting The Research Questions
Can COMBAT TRACK process the enormous amount of data logisticians require to forecast materiel and lift requirements? To answer this question, we must examine COMBAT TRACK from both a stand-alone and a network (i.e., if connected to other automated systems) perspective. Though COMBAT TRACK can operate as a stand-alone system, in reality it is a conduit, rather than repository of information. It was not designed to be a data base. Because it is not a data base, it provides only information relevant to items (and/or passengers) currently in the logistics pipeline. Additionally, it does not offer Can the use of space-based assets in the logistics arena reduce the transportation C 2 problems similar to those encountered in the Gulf War? COMBAT TRACK is not the only answer to current logistics C 2 difficulties. It is, however, a technologically feasible, currently available system that provides more timely and accurate logistics tracking than any system currently fielded. If tied to a database, the joint services arena would undoubtedly achieve increased logistics C 2 and enhanced in-transit visibility.
Unfortunately, COMBAT TRACK is not included in the DOD's migration plan, which identifies core systems to be used throughout the transportation network. This could ultimately prove to be a costly mistake, holding the Defense Transportation System back as the rest of the world moves into the twenty first century. Further, those who believe COMBAT TRACK is a stove-piped system are simply incorrect. This paper has shown just the opposite: COMBAT TRACK can provide much of the data needed by the transportation, maintenance, supply, operations, and command post communities.
Summary
As highlighted in previous chapters of this paper, COMBAT TRACK has opened the door for other uses of space-based assets in the logistics arena. This paper highlighted a few potential logistics applications noted during a brainstorming session with experts in the field. With a decreased budget and a downsized force, imagination, innovation, and accountability are vital to the military's success across the spectrum of conflict. If the Air Force is to continue being the most respected space and air force in the world, she must lead the way in space. 
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